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Abstract
This paper analyzes the existing relation between corruption and economic growth and
examines the possible outcome of a reform implemented by the State to weed out or reduce
corruption. It will be stressed that the reform against corruption tends, if not deemed by
the operators to last in time, to curb most productive investments and therefore involves
a time in which less corruption is paradoxically associated with less economic growth.
This model is supported by econometric analysis of the Italian case. Italy has arguably
been plagued by corruption. In the late 80s and early 90s several scandals that erupted
quickly led to well-known inquiries (under the name of Clean Hands) and were followed
(temporarily) by the an increased monitoring to prevent such practices. A dynamic panel
data approach to economic growth based on data of 20 Italian regions allows to estimate
a non-linear eﬀect of corruption on economic growth.
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Most economic researchers now attach great importance to corruption be-
cause of its signiﬁcant negative impact on the economic conditions of a coun-
try, as shown by data. As stated by Mauro (1998):
“A country that improves its standing on the corruption index, say, 6
to 8, (0 being the most corrupt, 10 the least) will experience a 4 percentage
point increase in its investment rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in
its annual GDP growth rate”.
Less importance was attached to the fact that not only the level, but also
the volatility of corruption may be detrimental to the well-being of a society.
As stated by Campos, Lien, and Pradhan (1999), in fact:
“it is not only the level of corruption that aﬀects investment but also
the nature of corruption. Corruption regimes that are more predictable – in
the sense that those seeking favours from the government do obtain those
favours – have less negative impact on investments than those that are less
predictable”. pp. 1059
This statement has obvious implications for policies meant to eradicate
corruption: a reform perceived as temporary, uncertain or not credible might
actually do more harm to the economy than its absence.
This paper attempts to ﬁnd theoretical consistency between these phe-
nomena, by analyzing the existing relation between corruption and economic
growth and the possible outcome of a reform implemented by the State to
weed out or reduce corruption.
The modern analysis of corruption (starting from the works of Rose-
Ackerman of 1975 and 1978) places such phenomenon within a principal-
agent scheme. In fact, the existence of corruption is subject to an agency
relationship between an individual in charge of making decisions (the agent)
and the owner of the interests (principal) he represents. A third party (in
our model the entrepreneur) should then be involved to inﬂuence the agent’s
discretional decisions to his own beneﬁt, upon the payment of a bribe. Fol-
lowing the assumptions of most recent works (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993),
the agency relationship between the bureaucrat (agent) and the Government
(principal) will not be analyzed, but focus will only be made on the possible
relation between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur (third party) in order
to better highlight the mechanisms through which such relations develop, as
well as the eﬀects of such behaviours on the economy.
In section 2, the relation between the monitoring level of bureaucrats
1by the State, corruption, and economic growth is reviewed. A non-linear
relation is observed between monitoring level and economic growth, as well
as between corruption level and economic growth. At low monitoring levels,
the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates, at
higher monitoring levels – say intermediate – no corruption occurs, but low
growth rates are recorded, whereas at high monitoring levels no corruption
occurs and high growth rates are recorded.
Based on such non-linear relation, the possible outcome, in terms of vi-
able growth, of a reform implemented by the State to weed out corruption is
reviewed in section 3. As noted, a reform aimed at weeding out corruption,
but not deemed by the agents to last in time, curbs most productive invest-
ments, and therefore involves a time in which less corruption is associated to
less productive investments, and therefore to less economic growth.
Some of the implications resulting from the theoretical model are tested
in section 4 for the Italian case in the 1971-1996 period. Italy although
not isolated is, among Western democracies, one which has known one the
highest levels of corruption and has experimented the severity of its political
repercussions.1 In fact, as stated by Della Porta and Vannucci (1999):
“the Italian case may be seen as a sort of ‘magnifying glass’ used to re-
view the mechanisms of hidden exchange, as well as the ability of the civil
society and of the political and institutional system to react to corruption.
The ‘Tangentopoli’ matters provided a ground for a clash between the legal
power and the political class, as well as a unique opportunity to reform the
very rules of the political game”. pp 12
The results conﬁrm the thrust of the message of the theoretical model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good. There are
two distinct categories of individuals in such economy. First bureaucrats, who
cannot invest in the production activity, and second the entrepreneurs, who
may invest their total capital in the modern sector or in the traditional one.
There is a continuum of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs and their number
is normalized to 1 for both the categories. A third agent is the State who
1Within the European Union, Italy ranks last before Greece in Transparency Inter-
national’s 2003 classiﬁcation of countries’ “low perception of corruption” index. It is
preceded also by the USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, and its overall rank is 33rd.
2controls entrepreneurs and bureaucrats behaviour in order to weed out or
reduce corruption. Economic agents are risk-neutral.
Firms manufacture a homogeneous product Y using either of two tech-
nologies with constant return to scale: the modern sector’s technology and
the traditional sector’s technology. Each entrepreneur is assumed below to
have the same quantity of capital k. The product may be either manufac-
tured for consumption purposes C or for investment purposes
•
k.
The bureaucrats issue, to the entrepreneur submitting a project, the li-
cence required to access the modern sector’s technology. The bureaucrats
receive a salary W = R. It is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between
the public and the private sector and that therefore there is no possibility
for the bureaucrats to become entrepreneurs, even if their salary W were
lower than the entrepreneur’s net return2. The bureaucrats, if indiﬀerent to
whether to ask or not ask for a bribe, will prefer to be honest.




Thus the technology of the modern sector works with constant return to
capital, equal to aM. The entrepreneurs in the modern sector need to obtain
a licence from the government to access the technology. In order to obtain
such licence, they need to submit a project to the Public Administration.
With no corruption in place, such project ensures that the licence is obtained,
but this involves an implementation cost of sk. 3
The proﬁt resulting from the investment in the modern sector referred to
as ΠM:
ΠM = aMk − sk
The entrepreneur may access the traditional sector without any licence
being issued by the Public Administration. In this case the output is:
Y = aTk
2This happens because Lb individuals in the population have no capital, but only a
job, and therefore may not become entrepreneurs, but should be satisﬁed with working as
bureaucrats and receiving a salary W.
3The cost for project submission to the Public Administration is a function of the
investment. The underlying assumption is that, as the size of the investment grows, the
costs for the entrepreneur’s bureaucratic practices also grow.
31 <a T <a M
Thus the return from the investment in the traditional sector is:
ΠT = aTk
From here on, it will be assumed that (aM − s) >a T and therefore that
the modern sector is more proﬁtable than the traditional sector.
The bureaucrat receives an income Wfrom his job:
ΠB = W
In this model, the bureaucrat may decide to only issue a licence in ex-
change for a bribe. The entrepreneur will assess the expected return in both
sectors and will choose to invest in the sector that provides a higher return
ex ante. Since, with no corruption in place, ΠM > ΠT, the entrepreneur may
ﬁnd it convenient to oﬀer a bribe to the corrupted bureaucrat in view of ob-
taining the necessary licence to access the modern sector. The bureaucrat4
will be assumed to have a monopolist power (which means that, given the
submitted project, he is the only one that may issue the licence required for
that project) and a discretional power (i.e. he may refuse to issue the licence
with no need to provide any reasons or explanations) in granting the licence.
The bureaucrat may decide not to ask for a bribe and to issue the licence
to all those that submit a project to the Public Administration, or he may
decide to ask for a bribe in exchange for such licence. The State controls
the bureaucrats in such a way that they have a probability q (monitoring
level) of being detected. A corrupted bureaucrat accepting a bribe from an
entrepreneur, if detected while performing the extortion, incurs a cost (either
monetary, moral, or criminal) equal to mk5 and the entrepreneur incurs a
4The modern analysis of corruption (starting from the works of Rose-Ackerman of 1975
and 1978) places such phenomenon within a principal-agent scheme. In fact, the existence
of corruption is subject to an agency relationship between an individual in charge of making
decisions (the agent) and the owner of the interests (principal) he represents. A third
party (in our model the entrepreneur) should then be involved to inﬂuence the agent’s
discretional decisions to his own beneﬁt, upon the payment of a bribe. Following the
assumptions of most recent works (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), the agency relationship
between the bureaucrat (agent) and the Government (principal) will not be analyzed,
but focus will only be made on the possible relation between the bureaucrat and the
entrepreneur (third party) in order to better highlight the mechanisms through which
such relations develop, as well as the eﬀects of such behaviours on the economy.
5The punishment for the detected bureaucrat is not a constant, but rather a function
of the investment level. This is because, following Rose –Ackerman (1999):
“The oﬃcial’s penalties should be tied to the size of the payoﬀs they receive and the
4cost (either monetary, moral, or criminal) equal to ck6,w h e r em,c >0.
2.1 Game description
The previous problem can be described by following three-period game:
(1) At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur should decide in which sec-
tor to invest, i.e. whether to invest his capital in the modern or in
the traditional sector. Such decision is tantamount to the decision of
whether to submit the project to the Public Administration, consid-
ering that a licence is needed to invest in the modern sector. Project
submission does not result into the automatic issuing of the licence by
the bureaucrat, in that the bureaucrat may refuse to grant the licence
unless a bribe b is paid.
If the entrepreneur decides not to submit the project (invest in the
traditional sector) the game ends. If the entrepreneur decides to submit
the project to the Public Administration, incurring a cost, he asks the
bureaucrat to issue the licence. In this case the game continues to stage
two.
(2) At this stage (stage 2), the bureaucrat, facing an entrepreneur that has
submitted a project to the Public Administration, may decide not to
probability of detection. If penalties are not a function of the size of the bribe, an an-
ticorruption drive would quickly confront a paradox. A high ﬁxed penalty will lower the
incidence of corruption but increase the size of the bribes paid. If the penalty is high, the
oﬃcials must receive a high return in order to be willing to engage in bribery. Thus the
expected penalty should increase by more than one dollar for every dollar increase in the
size of the bribe.”pp. 54
In the suggested model, since the paid bribe is a function of k, the punishment is assumed
to be a function of the bribe.
6The punishment for the entrepreneur, as for the bureaucrat, is not a constant, but
rather a function of the investment. In this case too, based on the statements of Rose -
Ackerman (1999):
“On the other side of the corrupt transaction, a ﬁxed penalty levied on bribers will
lower both the demand for corrupt services and the level of bribes. However, it will have
no marginal impact once the briber passes the corruption threshold. To have a marginal
eﬀect, the penalties imposed on bribe payers should be tied to their gains (their excess
proﬁts, for example)”. pp. 55
the punishment for the entrepreneur is considered as a function of the investment de-
termining the size of the proﬁts.
5ask for a bribe (bd = 0) to issue the licence; then the game ends with the
payoﬀs W for the bureaucrat and (aMk − sk) for the entrepreneur; or
he may negotiate the payment of a bribe (bd > 0) with the entrepreneur
to issue the licence. The game continues to stage three.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur should decide whether to negotiate
the bribe to be paid to the bureaucrat or to refuse to pay the bribe.
Should he decide to carry out a negotiation with the bureaucrat, the
two parties will ﬁnd the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to
a bargaining game (bNB) and the game ends. The payoﬀs will depend
on whether the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur are detected (with
probability q) or not detected (with probability 1 − q).
Thus, if the entrepreneur decides to pay7 the bribe bNB the expected
payoﬀ for the bureaucrat will be equal to W − mkq +( 1− q)bNB,while the
expected payoﬀ for the entrepreneur will be equal to (aM −s)k−(1−q)bNB−
ckq.
If the entrepreneur decides not to negotiate with the bureaucrat, the
latter will refuse to issue the licence; thus the game ends with the bureaucrat
receiving with certainty salary W and, having denied licence issuing to the
entrepreneur, the latter will have to invest in the traditional sector, with a
payoﬀ equal to (aTk−sk), where (aTk) stands for the proﬁts of the traditional
sector and sk is the cost of project submission to the Public Administration.
2.2 The solution to the game
This is a dynamic game, which may be solved by using the method of back-
ward induction, starting from the last stage of the game. Prior to the solution
of the game, the bribe resulting as the Nash solution to a bargaining game in
the last subgame should be determined. This bribe is the outcome of a nego-
7In this case, in fact, the payoﬀ for the bureaucrat, if detected, is equal to W − mk
where W is the paid salary and mk is the cost incurred by the bureaucrat when found to
accept a bribe. The payoﬀ for the entrepreneur if detected is equal to (aM −s−c)k where
(aM −s)k are the proﬁts achieved from operating in the modern sector and ck is the cost
incurred by the entrepreneur if found to oﬀer a bribe to the bureaucrat. The payoﬀ for
the bureaucrat if not detected is equal to W + bNB i.e. the salary plus the negotiated
bribe. The payoﬀ for the entrepreneur if not detected is equal to (aM − s)k − bNB, i.e.
the proﬁts less the bribe paid to the bureaucrat.
6tiation between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur, who will be assumed
to share a given surplus on an equal basis.
Let q  =1 8, then there exist a unique positive equilibrium bribe bNB,a s




(aM − aT)k − ckq + mqk
2(1 − q)

i.e., the entrepreneur gives half of the surplus to the bureaucrat, such surplus
being the diﬀerence in the return on the investment in the two diﬀerent
sectors (modern and traditional), net of half of the entrepreneur’s expected
cost for being detected and plus half of the bureaucrat’s expected cost for
being detected in a corrupted transaction.
2.3 Static equilibrium
2.3.1 Outcome
From the backward solution (described in Appendix A) of the game, 3 perfect
Nash equilibria are obtained in the subgames, according to the parameter
conditions, summarized in Table 1.
An attempt is now made to give an assumption for the three parameter






(equilibrium A) applies, once the entrepreneur has decided to submit the
project to the Public Administration, what the entrepreneur himself obtains
in addition from the modern sector compared to the traditional one is not
enough to make up for the expected cost for the entrepreneur and for the
bureaucrat for being corrupted and detected, and for the project implemen-
tation cost. With this in mind, the bureaucrat will not ask the entrepreneur
8If q = 1 we are not at this stage of the game.
9Cfr. Binmore K., - Rubinstein A., - Wolinsky A., (1986).
10The bribe associated to the Nash solution to a bargaining game turns out as a solution
to the following maximum problem: max
b∈ + Max[aMk−sk−(1−q)b−ckq−(aTk−sk)][W +
(1 − q)b − mqk − W]
where [(aTk − s),W] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payoﬀs that the entrepreneur
and the bureaucrat respectively would obtain if they did not come to an agreement.
7for a bribe. The entrepreneur, in turn, will ﬁnd it convenient to submit the
project to the Public Administration, and will obtain the licence without
paying any bribe.
If condition
0 ≤ q ≤
(aM − aT) − 2s
(c + m)
= q1
(equilibrium C) applies, the entrepreneur ﬁnds it convenient to submit the
project. The diﬀerence in proﬁts between the modern sector and what is
obtained from the traditional sector is such as to make up for the expected
cost of one’s corruption, of the bureaucrat’s corruption, and for the project
submission cost. Thus the surplus to be shared between the entrepreneur
and the bureaucrat will keep a negotiation going, whose outcome is the bribe
corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game.
If
q1 =






(equilibrium B) applies, once stage 2 is achieved, the bureaucrat will still
ﬁnd it convenient to ask for a positive bribe and the entrepreneur, at stage 3,
to start a negotiation. But at stage 1 the entrepreneur knows that what he
would obtain from project submission is less than what he would obtain by
investing in the traditional sector, and therefore will not submit the project
and the game will end in equilibrium B, where there is no corruption but all
entrepreneurs invest in the traditional sector.
Below (ﬁgures 1 and 2) is a graphic description of such non-linear relations
between monitoring level and output, and between corruption and output.
8Table 1: Parameter conditions: the three Nash equilibria.
qv a l u e 0 ≤ q ≤ q1 q1 <q<q 2 q2 ≤ q ≤ 1
The entrepreneur The entrepreneur The entrepreneur
Stage 1 submits does not submit submits
the project the project the project
The bureaucrat The bureaucrat The bureaucrat
Stage 2 asks asks does not ask
for a bribe for a bribe for a bribe
The entrepreneur The entrepreneur The entrepreneur
Stage 3 starts starts does not start
a negotiation a negotiation a negotiation
Equilibrium C B A
Corruption widespread none none




2 − sk −
(m+c)kq








9Figure 1: Corruption and income level.
Figure 2: Income level and monitoring.
2.3.2 Welfare implications
A State wishing to lead the economy towards one of the three viable equi-
libria, by setting a given monitoring level, should compare the three equi-
librium. The comparison highlights that equilibria A and C imply a higher
10output than equilibrium B. Equilibria A and C allow to obtain the same
output, even if they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of corruption level
(which is highest in C and nonexistent in A).
Thus the State will be indiﬀerent to whether it should set monitoring at
zero and keep the economy at equilibrium C with corruption or set such a
high monitoring level as to lead the economy to equilibrium A. In a static
perspective, corruption only performs a reallocating eﬀect, i.e. it inﬂuences
the sharing of the “cake” but not its size, and a State that only aims at “cake”
sharing has no kind of incentive to lead the economy to equilibrium A, since
monitoring is expensive. If, however, other elements prevail in assessing
whether one equilibrium is “more desirable” than another, or if political
elements are considered that either privilege the entrepreneurial class or the
bureaucrats, diﬀerent conclusions would be drawn.
In fact, consider a social function is considered as the weighted sum of
the payoﬀs of the bureaucrat and of the entrepreneur:
Fs = λΠI +( 1− λ)ΠB
where ΠI are the entrepreneur’s proﬁts and ΠB are the bureaucrat’s rev-
enues, λ and (1 − λ) are the weights attributed by the government to the
entrepreneurs’ and to the bureaucrats’ earnings respectively.
The values that this function may take change according to the values
of q that lead the economy to the diﬀerent equilibria, and according to the
diﬀerent weights the State attributes to the payoﬀs.
If the government, encouraged by lobbies, only privileges the bureaucrats








(c+m) . Because this condition applies at equilibrium C, in this case
(λ = 0) equilibrium C is more desirable than equilibrium A.
In the opposite case, where the State is only keen on the well-being (pay-








and therefore equilibrium A is always more desirable than either equilibrium
C or equilibrium B.
112.4 Dynamic equilibrium
The game perspective is now expanded to review the dynamic consequences
of corruption on growth and, therefore, on investments, while analysing the
entrepreneurs’ behaviour in this respect.




In this economy, the allocation of resources to consumption and capi-
tal accumulation is aﬀected by corruption. Agents derive satisfaction from




Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over inﬁnite time subject to a budget









k =Π I − C
where C is consumption, ρ is the discount rate in time.
Since the return on the investment for the entrepreneur ΠI is diﬀerent in
each of the three equilibria, the problem is solved for the three cases. In the
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By deriving the ﬁrst condition (1) and substituting it into the second one













In equilibrium A, the entrepreneur’s proﬁt is:
Π
A
I = aMk − sk
Thus the constraint is:
•
k = aMk − sk − C




+ λ[aMk − sk − C]
Optimization provides the following ﬁrst-order conditions that allow to






[aM − s − ρ]




thus the constraint is:
•
k = aTk − C




+ λ[aTk − C]
where λ is a costate variable. Similarly as for the other cases, the con-















It may be further easily demonstrated12 that the capital and the income
also have the same growth rate and therefore equilibrium A, from the dy-
namic viewpoint, is the equilibrium that allows greater economic growth.
Thus a far-sighted State, with long-term objectives, will be encouraged to
implement a reform to weed out corruption by leading the economy from
equilibrium C to equilibrium A. Figure 3 shows this in terms of income and
investment growth.
Figure 3: Growth rate and monitoring.
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then the diﬀerence between both terms on the right should also be constant, and because
a,s,c, q and m are constant, then C and k should grow at the same rate. Similarly, since
Y = aMk, at a steady state the income grows at the same rate as the capital. The same
applies in the case of equilibria A and B.
143T h e R e f o r m
The State may decide to implement a reform to weed out or reduce corrup-
tion. But implementing a reform implies a serious dilemma13.O n t h e o n e
hand, the entrepreneurs and the bureaucrats should respond to the signals
generated by the reform in order to ensure some degree of success of the
same; on the other, rational individuals will not respond to the reform in the
desired manner unless no uncertainty exists about the successful outcome of
the reform. In this case, any uncertainty about the successful outcome of the
reform may cause worse damage than the situation ex ante if it raises doubts
on its permanence in time.
This simple intuition is applied in our model with corruption to show
how reforms that seem to be desirable for economic growth could turn out
harmful if they raise doubts about their opportunity for implementation and
permanence in time. In this context, a reform aimed at weeding out corrup-
tion may indeed result into a lower growth rate than in case of corruption
if economic agents do not believe that such reform will last in time. The
State’s reform aimed at reducing corruption translates into a greater prob-
ability q of being detected while performing a corrupted transaction. The
State announces that a higher monitoring level will be implemented, and one
by which the probability q of being detected while performing a corrupted
deed increases from q to q  with q  >q . The economy is assumed to be at
a equilibrium characterized by widespread corruption, i.e. at equilibrium C.
Thus the following inequality applies:
0 ≤ q ≤
(aM − aT) − 2s
(c + m)
With this reform, the State wants to promote greater economic growth,
i.e. to reach equilibrium A. To this end, it raises the probability of being







153.1 The operators’ trust in the reform
Our model assumes that the operators may express expectations on the actual
permanence of the reform in time. In particular, the economic agents are
assumed to estimate that there is a given probability (1 − π) to revert to
the previous monitoring level. It is further assumed that an information
asymmetry exists, in that the State is unaware of the belief of the economic
agents, i.e. of the probability estimated by the operators that the reform is
not implemented. When a reform is announced, the economic agents deﬁne
an expected probability of being detected (q), weighted according to the
probability estimated by them that the reform will or will not last in time: it
should be considered, in fact, that the reform will last in time with probability
π; then, in this case, there is a true probability q  of being detected but, with
a probability (1−π), the reform will not last in time (this brings back to the
initial probability q) and in this case the actual increase of q will be lower.
The probability expected by the operators is q”w i t hq” <q   and equal to
q”=q π + q(1 − π). In this case, even if the State intended to increase
monitoring to lead the economy to equilibrium A, in truth the operators are
confronting a lower value q”. If this value is such that





the economy ends up at equilibrium B, representing a worse condition,
from the viewpoint of economic growth, of the desired outcome of the reform,
i.e. equilibrium A, as well as of the baseline equilibrium C.
4 An empirical check for Italy
4.1 Introduction
In the light of a widespread theoretic literature on corruption and on the
relation between this and the economic performance, the papers that tried
to estimate the impact of corruption on economic activity levels using data
are recent and scarce. Such empirical literature generally highlights a neg-
ative impact of corruption on economic growth: for example, the works by
Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Kaufmann and Wei (1999) and Li,
Xu and Zou (2000), carried out on diﬀerent samples, point out to a negative,
statistically signiﬁcant relation between corruption and economic growth. A
16number of sensitivity and robustness analyses, described in the cited works,
support this conclusion. Del Monte and Papagni (2001) highlight a nega-
tive impact of corruption on economic growth, and stress that such relation
changes according to the corruption level14.
The empirical check described in this section does not test, at least di-
rectly, the relation between corruption and economic growth. Instead, the
purpose of this part of the paper is to empirically review a number of impli-
cations that can be tested and that are directly derived from the theoretical
model described in the previous section15. A prediction of the presented
model is that a non-linear relation exists between the monitoring performed
by the State on bureaucrats to prevent the spreading of corruption and eco-
nomic growth. In fact, the dynamic model developed in the previous section
points out to a non-linear relation between the monitoring level performed by
the State, corruption, and economic growth. At low monitoring levels imple-
mented by the public bodies in charge, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats agree
to implement projects in innovative sectors, characterized by high growth
potentials; however, the reallocation of resources (using bribes) from the en-
trepreneurs to the bureaucrats that are not involved in the manufacturing
process reduces the growth potential generated by the investments of the
entrepreneurial class. At higher monitoring levels – say intermediate – the
entrepreneurs draw no beneﬁt from implementing projects in the innovative
sector, because of the costs of corruption, and this results into lower growth
rates for the economy. Finally, even higher monitoring levels – say high
– discourage both the entrepreneurs and the bureaucrats from performing
corrupted transactions, and this ensures investments by the entrepreneurs
in the innovative sector, while stimulating the accumulation process and,
ultimately, generating even stronger growth.
The empirical analysis of the paper aims at checking whether this model
prediction is conﬁrmed, using the Italian data. Our analysis refers to data
for the Italian regions and for the 1971-1996 period.
The non-linear character of the relation between the corruption monitor-
14Production in their model requires capital and, in particular, a public asset, the public
infrastructures. By worsening the quality of public infrastructures, corruption indirectly
hampers economic growth. Thus the relation that the authors submit to this empirical
check assumes that public infrastructures have a positive impact on economic growth
which, however, declines as corruption increases.
15Actually, as already mentioned in the previous section, this relation between the mon-
itoring aimed at limiting corruption and growth also reﬂects a relation between corruption
levels and economic growth levels. In fact, each of the monitoring value ranges corresponds
to a equilibrium that the economy may achieve, which is characterized by both a given
economic growth rate and a corruption level.
17Figure 4: Growth rate and monitoring.
ing level and the growth rate is formalized by using an empirical speciﬁcation
reﬂecting a parabolic relation between the two variables, with the concavity
upwards. To this end, the functional form of a second-grade polynomial was
selected for the empirical equation, as shown in Figure 4.
4.2 The data used
As stated above, an empirical analysis is performed on the Italian regional
data referred to the 1971-1996 period. Table 3 in Appendix B contains the
variables used for the estimate and the sources of the data used.
For the monitoring-level variable, a ﬁgure supplied by Istat was used16
specifying the number of reported corruption and misappropriation crimes
(in Appendix B). The drawback of this ﬁgure is that it can be interpreted
in diﬀerent ways. The number of reported corruption crimes is a function of
the corruption level, as well as of the level of prevention in place to reduce
the phenomenon. The following relation may be assumed:
No. of detected corruption crimes = f(Monitoring; corruption)
16The same choice was made by Del Monte (1996). In his work, the determinants of
corruption in the Italian regions are analyzed, and the same Istat ﬁgure that we used was
taken as an indicator for corruption.
18The number of crimes may then rise both because corruption has in-
creased in the system at the same monitoring level and because, with the
same corruption level in the system, the monitoring level by the legal and
police authority has increased. However the number of reported crimes is not
as a t i s f a c t o r yc h o i c ea sap r o x yo ft h emonitoring level, because its trend,
with the same corruption level, may reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of monitoring.
In the light of the above, the level of public investments was considered as
a proxy for corruption17. From the theoretical and empirical literature re-
viewed in the previous work it emerged, in fact, that corruption has a strong
correlation with the weight of the State on the economy and, thus, on the
public expenditure. Current expenditure (employee salaries, etc.) however
may be considered as being less inﬂuenced by corruption. The variable con-
sidered as a proxy for the monitoring level18 is then constructed as follows:
Monitor= No of corruption crimes
Public investments
Prior to the empirical analysis, it was deemed appropriate to provide a
few simple descriptive statistics (Table 4), summarized in the appendix C
for the main variables considered, along with a table (Table 5) with mean
monitoring level values and a mean income growth rate for the 1970-1996
period.
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of monitoring and of the mean GDP growth
rate. This chart shows an upward trend of the “monitor” variable, with two
relative peaks: one in 1978 and a sharper one in 1992. The “growth” variable
shows negative peaks in 1974 and in 1993. The monitoring value has a peak
in 1993. This evidence appears in line with the widespread perception that
the struggle against corruption (following the better known “Clean Hands”
scandal) became harsher in those very years, with higher monitoring levels.
17This intuition is supported by Rose - Ackerman (1999), who states that higher cor-
ruption levels are associated with a higher share of public investments over the GDP. An
alternative and satisfactory way to ﬁnd an index of regional corruption was adopted by
Golden and Picci (2001), suggesting a new measure of corruption for the Italian regions:
“We propose a novel alternative measure based on objective data, namely, the diﬀerence
between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and a measure of the
value of public capital stocks. Where the diﬀerence between the value of existing infras-
tructure and the actual physical infrastructure is larger, more money is being siphoned
oﬀ in mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement; that is, corruption is
greater”. pp 1
18To make both related values more similar in their order of magnitude, the numerator
(number of crimes) was multiplied by 1000.
19Figure 5: Monitoring (mean) and income growth rate. Years 1970-1996.
This would then lead to consider the mode by which the monitoring variable
was approximated as satisfactory, given the necessary caution.
4.3 The empirical speciﬁcation
In this section, the Italian data is checked for the above-described predictions
of the theoretical model. The speciﬁcation of the basic estimated equation
does not correspond to a structural form for a given model. On the contrary,
the basic equation is a reduced form speciﬁed in such a way as to allow a check
on whether a number of implications of the theoretic model are supported
by data.
The tested equation is expressed as follows:
growthit = β1growthit−1 + β2monitorit−1 + β3(monitorit−1)
2+
+β4growthinvit + β5conpait + eit
where growthit is the growth rate of the per-capita income at 1990 con-
stant prices, growthit−1 is the growth rate of the per-capita income de-
20layed by one period, monitorit−1is the monitoring level delayed by one pe-
riod, growthinvit is the investment growth rate at 1990 constant prices, and
conpaitis public consumption over the GDP. The growth rate of the delayed
income is included to express persistent dynamics in the manufacturing ac-
tivity. The investment growth rate and the level of public consumption over
the GDP are important control variables in the regression and are both often
included in regressions that try to explain the trend of the income growth
rate (see, for example, Levine and Renelt, 1992). The term eitrepresents the
stochastic noise, which is assumed to be IID. The index i refers to the regions
and the index t refers to time. The crucial explanatory variable is, obviously,
the monitoring level. According to the above statements, the variable “mon-
itor” is included in the equation in a non-linear form. A quadratic term is,
in fact, included for the variable.
There is a dual reason why the “monitor” variable is included in the
equation with a delay of one period: ﬁrst, because changes in the monitoring
level are very likely to require some time before they inﬂuence the operators’
decisions. Second, any distortions due to simultaneousness, resulting from
the possible endogeneity of the “monitor” variable, need to be mitigated.
Based on the predictions of the suggested theoretical model, a positive
(and statistically signiﬁcant) sign is expected for β3, pointing out to the ex-
istence of a non-linear relation between income growth rate and monitoring
level. The expected sign for β1 is positive, pointing out to a positive correla-
tion between the delayed growth rate and the income growth rate at time t;
ﬁnally, for the expected theoretic sign of the public expenditure/ratio (β5),
diﬀerent works in literature do not come to the same conclusion19.
The estimate of equation was performed with reference to the 20 Italian
regions in the 1971-1996 period using an appropriate method for dynamic
panels. The ﬁrst step was to ensure, using appropriate tests, that the model
was either speciﬁed with ﬁxed eﬀects or with random eﬀects, i.e. individual
eﬀects that may not be observed, which are not constant variables but, rather
random variables.
The model with random eﬀects is seen as an appropriate speciﬁcation if
the N individuals making up the panel are taken at random from a large
19In fact, as stressed by Levine and Renelt (1992):
“One the most important and frequently studies issues in economics is the role of ﬁscal
policy in economic development.(.......) it is worth mentioning some problems with these
ﬁscal policy measures. Government may provide growth – promoting public goods and
design taxes to close gap between private and social costs. On the other hand, governments
may waste funds, funnel resources to endeavours that do not encourage growth, and impose
taxes and regulations that distort private decisions.” pp . 949-951
21population.
In our case, the regions are not taken at random from a population, and
the model with ﬁxed eﬀects should then be deemed to better describe the
analyzed relations. This assumption, however, is supported by the value
taken by the Hausman test, used to establish whether the model should be
estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects or with random eﬀects. The test indicates that
the ﬁxed-eﬀects model is more desirable (28.37, p-value of 0.00).
The studied economic relation is dynamic as such, thus the advantage
of having panel data available allows to better understand the underlying
dynamics in the relation concerned, and the delayed dependent variable is
then considered among the regressors. A problem arises, however, because
the delayed value of the dependent variable is correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀects.
In fact, when dynamic relations between regressors are studied, including
the delayed dependent variable:
yit = δyi,t−1 + uit
with
uit = µi + νit
then the OLS estimates are distorted and inconsistent, even if the νit
noises are not serially correlated. In fact, yitis a function of µi, yi,t−1,w h i c h
is a regressor, and is therefore correlated with the error term. In the case
of our model, having considered a ﬁxed-eﬀects model, if an OLS estimator
is used with ﬁxed eﬀects, for the above reason, distorted and inconsistent
estimates would be obtained, because the delayed dependent variable would
be correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to take into account the endo-
geneity of regressors, the Generalized Moments Method (GMM) developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used to estimate panel data. This method
turned out eﬀective among the methods of estimation with instrumental vari-
ables. Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that appropriate instruments
in a dynamic model with panel data derive from the conditions of orthogo-
nality which exist between the appropriately delayed values of the dependent
variable (t − 3,t− 4 and even earlier) and noises νit.
In particular, to obtain consistent estimates of the parameter δ,t h ea b o v e
equation is diﬀerentiated:
yit − yi,t−1 = δ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)+( νit − νi,t−1)
For the period t=3 the following relation is observed:
yi3 − yi2 = δ(yi2 − yi1)+( νi3 − νi2)
22In this case yi1 is a valuable instrument, because it is correlated with
(yi2−yi1) but not with (νi3−νi2), in that errors νit are not serially correlated.
If the process is repeated for t =4 .....T, valuable instruments are obtained,
which allow to obtain eﬀective and consistent estimators.
The results of the estimates are summarized in the next section.
4.4 Results
As already noted, in order to obtain undistorted estimates, the generalized
moments method (GMM) discussed in the previous section was used, as de-
scribed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Table 2 contains the resulting evidence.
The results of the estimate, summarized in column a) of Table 2, further
empirically support the existence of a non-linear relation, which appears
statistically signiﬁcant, between the income growth rate and the monitoring
level: the squared coeﬃcient of the monitoring variable is positive (+0,013)
and signiﬁcant (the t statistic is 9.54). This would conﬁrm the existence of
a parabola-shaped relation with the concavity upwards.
Positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are also associated to the
investment growth rate (t in absolute value equal to 10) and to the diﬀerence
before the ratio of public consumption20 to incomes (t in absolute value equal
to 33.35).
For both speciﬁcations estimated with the GMM method, whose results
are summarized in Table 2, diagnostic tests were also performed. In particu-
lar, in order to assess the goodness of the speciﬁcation, the Sargan test and
the m2 test were calculated on the existence of a self-correlation of second-
order errors. The Sargan test values (19.05 with p-value 0.94 in speciﬁcation
a) and 19.28 with p-value 0.93 in speciﬁcation b)) show that the selected
instruments are appropriate, because the correlation between residuals and
instruments seems to be moderate (the asymptotic distribution of the test
is chi-square with 30 degrees of freedom). The test on second-order serial
correlation also shows that, with a 5-percent signiﬁcance level, the errors are
not self-correlated (the test’s asymptotic distribution is the usual standard).
20Similarly to the work of Del Monte and Papagni (2001), the diﬀerence before the ratio
of public consumption to GDP was considered. The reason is a possible non-steadiness
of this variable, as results from the empirical analysis carried out by the two authors on
Italian data.
23Table 2: GMM estimate of dynamic growth on panel data.
Dependent variable: growth
Variables a) b)
growth (-1) −0,069 −0,046




(9,54) ∗∗ (11,47) ∗∗
dconpa 0,003 0,003
(33,35) ∗∗ (48,20) ∗∗
growthinv 0,049 0,042




(−23,08) ∗∗ (−23,95) ∗∗
Sargan test : χ2 ( 30) 19,05 19,28
Prob>χ 2 0.939 0,934
Test on serial z 1,74 1,89
2nd-order correlation Prob>z (0,082) (0,06)
Observations 458 438
Number of regions 20 20
Absolute value of t in brackets: * 5% signiﬁcant; ** 1% signiﬁcant
245 Conclusions
The negative consequences of corruption on growth in the literature (see
Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Campos, Lien and Pradhan, 1999, and Wei, 1997)
are also related to the degree of uncertainty21 with respect to corruption
practices. But when no reforms are in place, if corruption is predictable, i.e.
if mechanisms are in place by which corrupted bureaucrats and entrepreneurs
may often meet, “stable” relations may be established with the information
ﬂows that help develop a reputation for the bureaucrats. In this case, bribery
occurs on an ongoing basis and the structure of relations is quite stable
in time: thus behavioural rules emerge and are consolidated between the
diﬀerent actors, as true informal norms that allow to reproduce a highly
corrupted system. Such stable “rules of the game” reduce the uncertainty
associated to the corrupted transaction, thus promoting investments. The
announcement of a reform aimed at curbing corruption “breaks” the stability
of these relations and may, if the economic agents do not fully trust that such
reform will be implemented, alter the economic beneﬁt for the entrepreneurs
investing in the modern sector, and thus result into reduced economic growth.
Thus the introduction of a reform to weed out corruption, if not fully trusted
by the economic agents, reduces corruption as well as economic growth.
The theoretical model developed highlighted a non-linear relation be-
tween corruption and economic growth and between the monitoring level
implemented by the police authority and economic growth. Based on such
result, a reform aimed at weeding out corruption, if not fully trusted by the
economic agents, was demonstrated to lead the economy to equilibrium with
less corruption compared to the one preceding the reform’s introduction, but
also with less economic growth. Thus a State wishing to implement a reform
to reduce or weed out corruption and improve economic growth should con-
sider this non-linear character of the corruption-economic growth relation: in
fact, in order for the economy to achieve a equilibrium with less corruption
and more economic growth, the reform should be “relevant”.
The empirical check performed for the Italian case seems to support a
number of predictions of the theoretic model described above.
“Clean hands” therefore will have proven to ensure healthy growth in the
Italian case only when citizens, enterprises, and bureaucrats will have sensed
a permanent shift in the political willingness to ﬁght corruption. In the
21In fact, as argued by Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999):
“it is not only the level of corruption that aﬀects investment but also the nature of
corruption. Corruption regimes that are more predictable – in the sense that those seek-
ing favours from the government do obtain those favours – have less negative impact on
investments than those that are less predictable”. pp. 1059
25absence of such clear commitments, ﬁghting corruption may have devastating
eﬀects on economic performance.
A Appendix: Solution to the static game
The static game is solved with the backward induction method, which allows
to identify the equilibria. Starting from stage 3, the entrepreneur needs
to decide whether to negotiate with the bureaucrat. Both payoﬀs are then
compared, because the bureaucrat asked for a bribe. The entrepreneur will
decide to negotiate if
(aTk − sk) <
(aM + aT)k
2



















the entrepreneur will decide not to negotiate (CASE II)
According to the value of the parameters, then, the outcome of the game





26Notice that q2 ∈ [0,1] is a probability if :
(aM − aT) ≤ c + m (3)
it means that the diﬀerence in the returns between the two sectors must
not be greater then the cost to be corrupt; consequently the presence of the
probability q determines the entrepreneur choice to enter in the transaction.
Going up the decision-making tree, the bureaucrat needs to decide whether
to ask bd > 0 or not ask bd =0f o rab r i b e .
Should he decide not to ask for a bribe, his payoﬀ will be W, whereas
should he decide to ask for a bribe, he knows that the entrepreneur will
deem it convenient to start a negotiation, whose outcome is bribe bNB,a n d
















the bureaucrat will always ﬁnd it convenient to ask for a bribe other than
zero (bd > 0 ). In particular, he will ask for a bribe bd = ∞. Such bribe will
be rejected by the entrepreneur, who will start a negotiation with outcome
bNB.
Proof. If both inequalities q<
(aM−aT)
(c+m) and (aM − aT) ≤ c + m are
veriﬁed (the ﬁrst is necessary to be in case I while the second is such that q2




≤ 1 ⇒ (c + m)q<(aM − aT) ≤ (c + m) ⇒
−(c + m)q>−(aM − aT) ≥− (c + m) ⇒
(aM − aT) − (c + m)q>(aM − aT) − (aM − aT) ≥ (aM − aT) − (c + m) ⇒
(aM − aT) − (c + m)q>0
27it means that the inequality holds for each parameter value belongs to
the parameter space deﬁned above.
At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur should now decide whether to
submit his project to the Public Administration, being aware of the outcome
of the negotiation.
Should he decide not to submit the project, his payoﬀ will be aTk,w h e r e a s
should he decide to submit the project and to pay bribe bNB to the bureau-
















c+m = q1 the entrepreneur will decide to submit the project
to the Public Administration and the bureaucrat will ask him for an inﬁnite
bribe, to which the entrepreneur will respond by oﬀering bribe bNB.
Notice that q1 ∈ [0,1] is a probability if :
0 ≤
(aM − aT) − 2s
c + m
≤ 1 ⇒ c + m ≥ aM − aT − 2s ≥ 0( 4 )
Proof. Let (aM − aT) ≤ c + m for the (3), then c + m − 2s<c+ m implies
c + m − 2s ≥ aM − aT − 2s so that
c + m>c+ m − 2s ≥ aM − aT − 2s
and consequently condition (4) holds if and only if




Notice that such a condition implies that the half of the surplus (as the dif-
ference between the returns of the two productivity sectors) must be greater
then the project cost.
If the previous hypothesis are veriﬁed, we also have to check if q1 <q 2.




































(aM − aT) − 2s
c + m
the entrepreneur will decide not to submit the project to the Public Admin-









At stage two, the bureaucrat should decide whether to ask bd > 0o rn o t
to ask bd =0f o rab r i b e .
Should he decide not to ask for a bribe, his payoﬀ will be W, whereas
should he decide to ask for a bribe, he knows there is no room for negotiation,
and therefore he will refuse to grant the licence to the entrepreneur, who will
have to invest in the traditional sector. In this case the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ
will be W.
Thus the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ is the same as if he decides to ask for a bribe
equal to zero. As noted, in this case of equal payoﬀ, the bureaucrat may be
assumed to prefer to be “honest”, and therefore not to ask for a bribe.
At stage one the entrepreneur should now decide whether to submit his
project to the Public Administration. Should he decide not to submit the
29project, his payoﬀ will be equal to aTk, whereas should he decide to sub-
mit his project, his payoﬀ will be equal to aMk − sk. Since by assumption
aMk − sk > aTk, in this case the entrepreneur will submit the project and





Proposition 1. Let 0 ≤ q2 ≤ q1 ≤ 1 as in (3) and (4). Thus the
following 3 parameter conditions may occur:
q ≥
(aM−aT)




and In this case equilibrium B is achieved
q>




(c+m) In this case equilibrium C is achieved.
B Appendix: The data and the relevant sources
The legal statistics of Istat represent one of the main sources for region-based
corruption analysis. Corru p t i o nc r i m e sf a l lw i t h i nt w oc l a s s e so fc r i m e sc o n -
sidered by Istat. The ﬁrst class includes crimes by public oﬃcials considered
by the criminal code (arts. 314 and 322) and referred to as embezzlement
of public funds or misappropriation (art. 324); the second class concerns
private interests in oﬃcial deeds. The considered ﬁgure refers to the total
number of crimes that Istat classiﬁes with serial numbers from 286 to 294,
namely:
286 Embezzlement of public funds
287 Embezzlement by drawing proﬁt from another’s error
288 Misappropriation to the damage of private individuals
30Table 3: The variables used and the relevant sources
GDP at 1990 prices 1970-1979: Svimez22 (1993);
1980-1996: Istat, “Conti Economici Regionali”,
various years
Gross ﬁxed 1970-1979: unpublished ISTAT data, CRENoS23
investments processing of Svimez estimates (1993);
at 1990 prices 1980-1996: Istat, “Conti Economici Regionali”,
various years
Corruption level 1970-1996: Istat, “Annuario Statistico e Giudiziario”,
various years
Population 1970-1996: Istat, Annuario Statistico Italiano,
various years
Public investments 1970-1996: Bonaglia -Picci (2000)
at 1990 prices
Public consumptions 1970-79, unpublished ISTAT data,
at 1990 prices CRENoS processing of Svimez estimates (1993);
ISTAT,“Conti Economici Regionali”, 1997;
1980-95, ISTAT, “Conti Economici Regionali”, 1998.
31289 Extortion
290 Corruption for oﬃcial deeds
291 Corruption for deeds contrary to oﬃcial duties
292 Corruption of a party in charge of a public service
293 Corruptor’s liability
294 Incitement to corruption.
While data is available since 1961, it is not homogeneous as of 1968,
because data for the 1961-1968 period refers to the crimes reported to the
legal authority and therefore has a wider scope than the data concerning
the years after 1968, for which only the crimes reported to the authority are
considered against which the legal authority has brought a criminal action.
A processing of the data on corruption for the years before 1961 can be
found in Cazzola (1987), but it only concerns Italy at a national level.
C Appendix: Descriptive data statistics
32Table 4: Descriptive statistics.
Variable NO b s . Mean Median Min Max Std.Dev.
GDP 540 0,0246 0,021 −0,06 0,514 0,036
(growth rate)
Investment 540 0,0146 0,016 −0,375 0,41 0,091
(growth rate)
Monitor 539 0,1963 0,104 0 2,377 0,257
Public 540 294024,8 297079,6 27535,2 555253,9 86250
Investment
Public 540 9662,3 7249 347 33595 7403,1
Consumption
Legend: For public consumption and investment, the measurement unit is
billions of ITL at 1990 constant prices. The GDP and investment growth
rates are not expressed in percent numbers.





























Legend: the GDP growth rate is not expressed in percent numbers.
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